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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is vested in this court pursuant to Section
78-4-11 Utah Code Annotated.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal of a conviction for driving or being in
actual

physical

control

of

a

motor

vehicle

while

under

the

influence of alcohol.
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
Defendant was arrested for DUI and driving while on suspension
on February 17, 1990. He was arraigned in the Third Circuit Court,
Tooele Department on March 8, 1990.

Trial was scheduled for March

29, 1990 but was continued to April 23, 1990.
convicted of DUI.

Defendant was

He was sentenced on June 8, 1990.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On March 8, 1990, defendant appeared before the Honorable
Edward A. Watson, Third Circuit Court, Tooele Department, for
arraignment. At that time, the court set trial for March 29, 1990.
(R. 9)

Defendant stated that that time was only four days after a

scheduled appointment with his attorney.
defendant

"...

The court then told

you call him and tell him you—you've been

arraigned, you have the notice of the trial date, let him at least
begin reviewing it, and he'll probably having [sic] you in earlier
or something, to discuss it." (Arraignment T. 6)

Notwithstanding

the court's admonition to the defendant to see counsel sufficiently
1

in advance of trial, defendant apparently waited until :)ust before
trial to contact his attorney. (Motion T. 4 ) .
On March 27, 1990, two days before trial, Mr. Franklin L.
Slaugh filed an appearance and a jury demand.

On March 2 9, 1990,

the trial date, Mr. Slaugh moved the court for a continuance of the
trial.

As grounds for the motion, Mr. Slaugh said that he had had

insufficient time to prepare
witnesses.

and to interview the

Mr. Slaugh said he asked the defendant

defendant's
" . . . why he

waited so long to get in touch with me, and his response was that
he was trying to come up with the money before he contacted me.

I

would have preferred a little more lead time, as I've indicated, to
prepare for the matter." (Motion T. 4)

Defendant was not present

on the date set for trial although he had been personally notified
of the trial date and Mr. Slaugh directed him to appear.

(Motion

T. 3)
The prosecutor

did not

object

to the

continuance

if the

defendant paid witness fees and would not use the continuance as a
vehicle to cure an untimely jury demand. (Motion T. 3)
expressly waived defendant's jury demand.

Mr. Slaugh

(Motion T. 3,5)

The

court never indicated to Mr. Slaugh that the continuance would be
denied unless defendant waived the right to a jury trial. (Motion
T. 2-5)
Defendant

was tried

on April

23, 1990.

Officer

Shelton

testified that the defendant was behind the wheel of a vehicle when
the officer approached it (Trial T. 10) and that the engine was
running at the time.

(Trial T. 29)
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Officer Shelton noted that

defendant's speech was slurred, he had an odor of alcohol, and
although the defendant searched for several minutes, he was unable
to locate either his driver's license or the vehicle registration.
(Trial T. 11)

Defendant's balance was poor (Trial T. 11) and he

admitted having consumed "a few beers." (Trial T. 12)
Officer Shelton also testified that after determining that
defendant had no injuries, he administered

some field sobriety

tests on a smooth paved surface with no adverse wind conditions.
(Trial

T.

12)

Defendant

was

unable

miscounted, and lost his balance

to

follow

repeatedly

instructions,

during the tests.

(Trial T. 13-15)
Officer Shelton is a category one certified peace officer.
(Trial

T.

4-5)

Based

upon

his

training,

experience,

and

observations of the defendant, Officer Shelton opined that the
defendant was impaired to a degree that he could not drive safely.
(Trial T. 15) Officer Shelton arrested the defendant and asked him
to take an intoxilizer test.
17)

The defendant refused.

(Trial T. 16-

The defendant continued to refuse to take the test even after

being warned that his license could be revoked for a year for
refusing.

(Trial T. 17-18)

The defendant called Kerry R. Lenzing as a witness.

On cross

examination, Mr. Lenzing testified that defendant was "drunk."
(Trial T. 26)
Defendant

was

found

guilty

Influence of Alcohol.

3

of

Driving

While

Under

the

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Evidence

adduced

at trial

from both the

State's

and

the

defendant's witnesses established beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant was too intoxicated to drive safely while in actual
physical control of a motor vehicle.

Defendant could not find his

license or registration, was unable to perform

field

sobriety

tests, and had physical characteristics consistant with being under
the influence of alcohol.
defendant

was

impairment.

incapable

The arresting officer testified that
of driving

safely

due to his

alcohol

Defendant did not testify but called a witness who on

cross examination said that the defendant was "drunk."

(Trial T.

26) .
Defendant's trial counsel willingly waived defendant's right
to a jury trial.

The trial judge did not condition defendant's

request for a continuance upon a jury trial waiver.

While the

prosecutor stated that the State would not object to a continuance
if it would not be used to cure a late jury demand, the court did
not indicate that granting of the continuance was contingent upon
the waiver.

ARGUMENT
I.

Defendant Was in Actual Physical Control of a Vehicle While
Too Intoxicated to Drive Safely.
Defendant challenges the trial court's findings that he was

too intoxicated to drive safely.

Defendant has the burden on

appeal to show that the court's findings were clearly erroneous.

4

In order to show clear error, the appellant
must marshal all of the evidence in support of
the trial court's findings of fact and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against
attack.
State v. Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990).
The trial court found that 1) the officer had probable cause
to stop the truck; 2) defendant was in actual physical control of
the truck at the time of the stop; 3) defendant was impaired by
alcohol to the extent that he was not able to drive safely.
T. 37)

(Trial

Defendant does not challenge the court's findings that

probable cause existed nor that defendant was in actual physical
control of the truck.

Rather, he asserts that the evidence did not

establish a sufficient degree of impairment.
This argument ignores evidence presented both by the State and
by defendant's own witness.

The State's witness established that

defendant's speech was slurred, he had an odor of alcohol, and,
although he searched for several minutes, he was unable to locate
either his driver's license or his vehicle registration.
11)

Defendant's balance was poor

(Trial T.

(Trial T. 11) and he admitted

having consumed "a few beers." (Trial T. 12)

When Officer Shelton

administered field sobriety tests, defendant was unable to follow
instructions, miscounted, and lost his balance repeatedly.
T. 13-15)

(Trial

Officer Shelton also offered his opinion as a trained

and experienced peace officer that defendant was impaired to a
degree

that

he

could

not

drive

safely.

(Trial

T.

15)

Additionally, the defendant's refusal to take an intoxilizer test
5

(Trial T. 16-18) can best be described as conduct indicating a
consciousness of guilt.
Defendant's own witness, Kerry R. Lenzing, testified that
defendant was "drunk,"

(Trial T. 26)

While any one of these facts, taken in isolation, may not
prove defendant's guilt, taken together the effect is synergistic
and constitutes overwhelming proof.
Defendant's brief seems to imply that the trial court somehow
improperly considered the driving pattern as proof of defendant's
guilt.

(Appellant's Brief 5 ) .

The court's findings, however,

clearly show that the court considered the driving pattern only as
providing probable
defendant's
evidence

cause

for the

impairment.

of

(Trial

defendant's

stop and not as evidence of
T.

37-8)

impairment,

Indeed,

coupled

with

the
his

other
actual

physical control of the vehicle, was so strong as to make any
consideration of a driving pattern wholly unnecessary.
II.

Defendant's Waiver of Jury Trial Was Proper and Uncoerced.
Defendant asserts that he was "forced" to waive a jury trial

because the court knew that "defendant's appointment with counsel
was less than ten days before the date the [c]ourt set for trial."
(Appellant's Brief 6) . On the contrary, the trial setting gave the
defendant more than adequate time to meet with counsel and timely
demand

a

Moreover,

jury
the

trial,

or,

court warned

if

necessary,

defendant

sufficiently in advance of the trial.

to

obtain

new

counsel.

contact

his

attorney

(Arraignment T. 6)

Given

current caseloads and speedy trial considerations, it would be
6

folly

to

expect

trial

courts

to

calendar

cases

around

the

appointment schedules of defendants and counsel.
Defendant also claims that his trial counsel "was told by the
prosecutor that the only way he could get a continuance was to
waive the jury demand." (Appellant's Brief 6)
simply unsupported in the record.

This assertion is

When Mr. Slaugh made his motion

to continue, the prosecutor made the following statement:
Your Honor, I—I've told Mr. Slaugh that I
didn't have an objection to the continuance
with two caveats; one being that he pay the
witness fee for Officer Shelton who will be
here
momentarily,
and
the
other,
my
understanding is that the jury demand was not
timely and that it would still be a bench
trial, if it were continued.
(Motion T. 3) The court never indicated that the continuance would
be denied if defendant did not waive the right to a jury trial.
(Motion T. 2-5)

In fact, Mr. Slaugh never opposed the notion of

trying the case to the bench.

Rather, he said "[a]nd I don't have

any objection to that, your Honor, a bench trial in this is—would
be fine." (Motion T. 3)

Certainly, this court should not reverse

defendant's conviction for lack of a jury trial when defendant's
attorney expressly waived the jury rather than entreat the court to
grant both a continuance and a jury trial.

Nothing prohibited

counsel from requesting the trial court to grant a jury trial in
addition to a continuance.

The waiver, in effect, took that issue

out of the trial court's hands.

While one may infer from the

record that the prosecutor would have opposed the continuance if
counsel had not waived the jury demand, (Motion T. 3 ) , such
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opposition is obviously no* tantamount to the court's ruling on the
issue.
Objections which have never been raised in the trial court may
not be considered on appeal.

Lopez v. Shulsen, 716 P.2d 7 87 (Utah

1986); State v. Chancellor, 704 P.2d 579

(Utah 1985).

And, an

express waiver of rights by trial counsel is not reversible error
in the absence of a showing that counsel's representation of the
defendant was incompetent.

Defendant has not alleged incompetence

of counsel in this appeal.

In fact, nothxng in the record suggests

that counsel's decision was other than a tactical one.

While some

constitutional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal,
State v. Pierce, 655 P.2d 676 (Utah 1982),

the Constitution does

not guarantee a jury trial for offenses punishable by a maximum of
six months imprisonment.
US

Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489

, 103 L.Ed 2d 550, 109 S Ct

(1989); Baldwin v. New York,

399 US 66, 26 L.Ed 2d 437, 90 S Ct 1886 (1970) .
In misdemeanor

cases,

unlike

felony

cases,

there

is

no

requirement that the defendant waive the right to a jury trial in
open

court.

In

fact,

no

right

to

a

jury

trial

exists

in

misdemeanor cases absent a written demand at least ten days before
trial.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, 17(c)&(d).

On March 8,

1990, defendant was given notice of trial to be held on March 29,
1990.

(R. 9 ) . Defendant's jury demand was not filed until March

27, 1990, only two days before the trial.

(R. 10) . Defendant thus

had forfeited his right to a jury trial on the March 29 date.
Further, the right to trial by jury may be waived
8

not only in

misdemeanor cases, as is this case, but even in felony cases,
where no jury demand is required.
(Utah App. 1989) .

State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134

This right may be waived by counsel in the

absence of the defendant. Id. at 138.

In Jamison, the defendant

was convicted by a jury of felony theft.

The court recessed for

lunch before beginning the enhancement phase of the trial.

When

the court reconvened, the defendant failed to appear. His attorney
waived the

jury on the penalty

phase

even though he had not

received the defendant's authorization to do so. Id. at 136.

On

appeal, the defendant claimed that the court erred in dismissing
the jury from the enhancement phase. This Court, however, affirmed
the conviction and sentence.
[W]hile the right to a jury trial is
guaranteed by amendment VI of the United
States Constitution and by article I. section
12 of the Utah Constitution, it may be waived.
Under the circumstances, it would be a
miscarriage of justice to allow defendant to
profit from his unexcused absence from the
court.
Id. at 138. (citations omitted)
In this case, as in Jamison, defendant was absent from court
without excuse.
the

position

Defendant, by his absence, placed his attorney in

of

defendant's input.

deciding

whether

to

waive

the

jury

without

Mr. Slaugh then decided to waive the jury.

As

in Jamison, defendant should not now be allowed to profit from his
unexcused absence.

9

CONCLUSION
Accordingly, the State of Utah respectfully requests that the
defendant's conviction for DUI be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted this

day of January, 1991.

John K. West, Deputy Tooele County
Attorney

I certify that four cop.es of the forgoing Brief of Appellee
were hand delivered this
day of January, 1991 to the office
of Mr. Alan K. Jeppesen, Attorney for the Defendant/Appellant.

John K. West
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